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UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW - CONFLICT OF FEDERAL AND STATE POWER
OVER PATENT AGENTS
Two recent decisions determining whether patent agents, not members of their
respective state bars, but admitted to practice before the United States Patent Office,
can represent clients in patent matters in these states, have added confusion to the
already perplexing subject of unauthorized practice before federal administrative
agencies. The Supreme Court of Florida in State of Florida, ex rel. The Florida
Bar v. Sperry' held that the admission of a nonlawyer to practice before the United
States Patent Office, does not authorize him to practice "patent law" in Florida.
That court by a sweeping injunction held in effect that all the work performed by
a patent agent in representing a client constituted the practice of law and could
therefore be legally done in Florida only by a licensed attorney, regardless of the
fact that the rules of the Patent Office expressly permit nonlawyers to act before
it in a representative capacity.
However, in Battelle Memorial Institute v. Green,2 the Ohio Court of Appeals
declared that admission to practice before the Patent Office precluded Ohio from
requiring members of a corporation's patent section to be admitted to the Ohio
bar before they can legally handle patent matters in Ohio for clients of the cor-
poration.
In an attempt to resolve the conflict presented by these cases this Note will
examine (1) the procedures involved in the representation of a client before the
Patent Office, to determine if such practice does in fact constitute the practice of
law; (2) the nature of a state's power to regulate the practice of law, determining
whether this power is basically legislative or judicial; (3) the extent of the state
regulatory power over nonlawyers admitted to practice before the Patent Office,
where that agency expressly reserves authority over admissions.
L Unauthorized Practice of Law
The practice of law by unqualified persons was historically responsible for
the establishment of the bar. From the very beginning of the legal profession it
was necessary to exclude from practice those who were unlearned in the ever-
expanding body of legal principles. The bar thus arose "from the public demand
for the exclusion of those who assumed to practice law without adequate qualifi-
cation."3 In order to effectuate this purpose, statutes were passed, one of which
provided for examination of attorneys to ensure that only those could be qualified
to practice as were "good and virtuous, and of good fame, learned and sworn to
their duty.
' 4
The limitation of practice to the qualified is based on broad principles of
protecting the public from inadequate representation that could well result in the
loss of important rights. In Sperry, the court elaborated on these policy considera-
tions inherent in the exclusion of nonlawyers from the practice of law and stated
that such exclusion was not done merely to aid members of the legal profession
in creating and maintaining a monopoly or closed shop, but rather "to protect the
public from being advised and represented in legal matters by unqualified persons
over whom the judicial department can exercise little, if any, control in the matter
of infractions of the code of conduct which, in the public interest, lawyers are bound
to observe."5
In order to protect the public from harm at the hands of an inept practitioner,
1 140 So.2d 587 (1962). Cert. granted. 83 S. Ct. 148 (1962).
2 No. 6704, C.A. Ohio, Feb. 13, 1962.
3 Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Service Ass'n, 55 R.I. 122, 179 A.139, 144 (1935).
4 St. 4 Hen. IV c. 18, 3 BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 26. See generally, von Baur, Prac-
tice Before Administrative Agencies And the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 15 FED. B.J. 103
(1955). Note, 36 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 374 (1961).
5 140 So.2d at 595.
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admission to the bar is "based upon the threefold requirements of ability, character,
and responsible supervision. ' ' 6 But with the rise of specialized, quasi-judicial,7
administrative agencies, the problem area of unauthorized practice greatly increased'
and the procedures for excluding nonlawyers from the practice of law became
more complicated. 9
This problem is further accentuated by the extent to which nonlawyers are
admitted as representatives before federal administrative agencies. The last survey,
taken in 1953,10 showed that out of the 46 civilian agencies studied, 32 permitted
nonlawyers to serve as trial counsel before them, and of the 27 military agencies
which conduct adversary proceedings, 19 permitted nonlawyers to appear and
act as trial counsel before them.
The United States Patent Office in rule 341 (b) expressly permits nonlawyers
to be admitted to practice before it. That rule states:
Agents. Any citizen of the United States not an attorney at law who
fulfills the requirements and complies with the provisions of these rules
may be admitted to practice before the Patent Office .... 11
Practice Before Patent Office by Patent Agents: Practice of Law?
Although it is generally recognized that no comprehensive definition of the
practice of law can be made, nor can any limits be prescribed to the scope of that
activity,12 yet the court in Sperry attempted to formulate such an all-inclusive
definition:
[I]t is safe to follow the rule that if the giving of such advice and the
performance of such services affect important rights.., and if the reasonable
protection of the rights and property of those advised and served requires
that the person giving such advice possess legal skill and the knowledge of
law greater than that possessed by the average citizen, then . . . such
services . . . constitute the practice of law."s
The Massachusetts court in Lowell Bar Association v. Loeb14 argued against
this type of broad definition. There it was stated:
The proposition cannot be maintained, that whenever, for compensation,
one person gives to another advice that involves some element of law, or
performs for another some service that requires some knowledge of law,
or drafts for another some document that has legal effect, he is practicing
law."5
Based on their definition, the Sperry court concluded that Practice before the
Patent Office constituted the practice of law, stressing the "legal" knowledge
required in the preparation of a patent application.
Such applications they state require "extensive knowledge of the law, statute
and case, in a field of the law that is as technical and involved as any known
6 Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468, 48 N.W.2d 788, 795 (1951).
7 See, e.g., Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938).
8 von Baur, supra note 4, at 104.
9 Id. at 106. Mr. von Baur states:
[W]here a lawyer feels keenly about the practice of law by a non-lawyer
before an administrative agency, there has been little that he could do about
it, the only real recourse being to a Federal agency itself . . . or to Congress
- both formidable forums to approach.
10 von Baur, STANDARDS OF ADMISSIoN FOR PRAcTicE BEFORE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIvE
AGENCIES (1953).
11 Patent Office Rules of Practice, 37 C.F.R. § 1.341 (b) (1960).
12 See West Virginia State Bar v. Earley, 144 W.V. 504, 109 S.E.2d 420 (1959).
13 Supra note 1, at 591. See, e.g., Land Title Abstract & Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio
St. 23, 193 N.E. 650, 652 (1934). There the court states:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in courts. It
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings and the management of such actions . . . on behalf
of clients ... and in addition conveyancing, the preparation of legal instru-
ments of all kinds, and in general all advice to clients and all action taken for
them in matters connected with the law.
14 315 Mass. 176, 52 N.E.2d 27 (1943).
15 Id. at 31.
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today."' 6  Furthermore, "the preparation of applications for patents, and the
amendments thereto, involves the preparation of the terms of an involved contract
and proof of the right to have same issued by the government, requiring legal knowl-
edge and skill far in excess of that possessed by the layman."'
7
The Battelle court however stressed the fact that technical acumen is a very
important part of the specialized knowledge required for a competent representa-
tion in patent matters. "[Riequirements for admission to practice before the United
States Patent Office make it clear that skill in engineering and scientific matters
is as necessary as skill in legal matters, and persons who are attorneys may qualify
for admission as agents."' s
To resolve this conflict, it is necessary to examine in detail exactly what the
patent agent or attorney does. These actions can be divided into three main areas;
(1) rendering opinions as to patentability after instigating a patent search; (2)
working before the Patent Office, mainly preparing patent applications and amend-
ments to these applications; (3) protecting the rights of the patentee by repre-
senting him in infringement actions or by dealing with the patent as a property
right.
In this first area, a patent agent or attorney to whom an invention disclosure
has been submitted will usually recommend a preliminary search before filing a
patent application. He submits this disclosure to a private searcher in Washington
who searches the prior art, picking out those patents which most closely approxi-
mate the salient features of the submitted disclosure. Depending on the prior art
the patent attorney or agent will conclude as to the patentability'of the submitted
invention. This conclusion will form the basis for his recommendation as to
whether or not the inventive features in the submitted disclosure warrant the filing
of a patent application with the Patent Office.
If an application is filed it will include a specification describing the invention
in appropriate technical terms and, where the nature of the case requires it, a
drawing. The "claims" form the operative part of the application. The language
of these claims is all important to the patentee, for the patent may be invalid if
they are drawn too broadly and easily avoided as to be practically worthless if they
recite unnecessary details. The claims must be formal and set forth the invention,
and at the same time must define the invention with adequate breadth of language.' 9
If the application is rejected by the patent examiner, the patent attorney or
agent must prepare an amendment to the application. If the rejection is on the
basis of the prior art, the amendment may include the addition of new claims or
the amendment of rejected claims, and will include the preparation of a brief
presenting factual and legal arguments.20 If these amendments do not result in
the allowance of the application, and the examiner makes his rejection final, the
patent attorney or agent may take an appeal to the Patent Office Board of Appeals,




Another procedure may develop in the Patent Office where an "interference"
is declared, that is where two or more pending applications contain claims for
16 140 So.2d at 592.
17 Ibid. The court concludes here that the preparation of such documents is unquestion-
ably the practice of law and the fact that the preparation and procedures are not done in a
court but rather before an administrative agency does not change the character of the acts
from legal to non-legal.
18 Supra note 2 at 9.
19 25 UNAUTH. Pasc. NEws 112 (1959).
20 See Marshall v. New Inventor's Club, 117 N.E.2d 737, 739 (Ohio Ct. Com. P. 1953).
The court also points out that this brief, because it requires citing authority on points of law
which might be applicable to a particular fact in issue requires a greater knowledge of Patent
Law than the preparation of the original application.
21 Patent Office Rules of Practice, 37 C.F.R. § 1.192 (1960).
22 Id. at § 1.194.
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substantially the same invention.28 The "interference" is decided by the Board of
Patent Interferences upon briefs and oral arguments.
24
If the Board of Appeals or the Board of Patent Interferences rules adversely
to the applicant he may take an appeal to the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, 25 or he may bring a civil action in the Federal District Courts .2  Once
the prosecution of the application goes to the courts, the nonlawyer patent agent
is bound to step aside since the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,27 and the
District Courts permit parties to be represented only by attorneys.
The last area of this division involves the steps taken by a practitioner in
furthering the rights of a patentee, mainly by assignment of that right, or giving
the required notice to an infringer, or even bringing an action against such
infringement.
In order to determine which of these actions a patent agent should be allowed
to perform without violating state laws or policies against the unauthorized practice
of law a more general division of Patent Office procedures will be made, grouping
them according to the areas of law involved. A proposed division would be: (1)
The purely statutory law that governs the creation of the property right, that is,
covers the requirements and procedures incident to securing the grant of the patent;
(2) The general substantive law of persons and property including the law of court
procedures as it relates to use, conveyance and enforcement of rights in patent
property.
28
This twofold classification is the basis for allowing nonlawyers to practice
before the Patent Office, because corresponding to the two general areas of law,
two types of practitioners could be utilized.
1. Those who work within the narrow confines of the Patent Statutes and
Patent Office rules to create the property that is a patent.
2. Those who cover the field of use, conveyancing and enjoyment of the
patent as a species of the general law of persons and property, and the
conduct of litigation arising thereunder.
2 9
Under such a classification, it is readily apparent that the last division out-
lined above, that is, protecting the patent right by dealing with it as a property right,
clearly falls within the second broad area and is generally considered outside the
permissible limits of the nonlawyer practitioner's authority. Up to this point the
Patent Office considers the agent useful, with a well-recognized function and an
official status. But once the agent has caused the invention to become a property
right, the agent "must according to law step aside and yield to a member of the
Bar for the performance of so simple a service as drawing an assignment." 30
Thus, the step which the Patent Office considers critical regarding the limit
of the agent's authority is after the creation of the property right in the inventor
and before "any dealings with or exercise of the rights in the patent as property
or the relation of persons thereto, . . ."31 However, in the matter of interferences,
involving a hearing to determine priority between two or more applications, there
appears to be a conflict with the above division for which the Patent Office allows
agents to represent clients in this area, the fact that the hearing is adversary in
23 66 Stat. 801 (1952), 35 U.S.C. § 135.
24 See Patent Office Rules of Practice, 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.251-59 (1960).
25 66 Stat. 802 (1952), 35 U.S.C. § 141.
26 Id. at § 145.
27 C.C.P.A. R. 2.
28 Dienner, Patent Law Associations, 32 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 828, 831 (1950).
29 Id. at 832-33.
30 Ibid. See, e.g., Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Kellogg, 338 Ill. App. 618, 88 N.E.2d 519 (1949).
The court here says that the preparation of assignments, leases and licenses of patents regardless
of the fact that forms are used rather than original documents, constitutes the practice of law
and is prohibited to nonlawyers.
31 Dienner, supra note 28, at 833.
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character requiring the admission of evidence and the cross-examination of wit-
nesses on deposition would seem to require its classification in the second area of
law, even though it is prior to the creation of the property right.32
Skills Involved in Drawing Patent Application: Legal or Technical?
In reaching its conclusion that the preparation of documents for the procure-
ment of a patent does in fact constitute the practice of law, the Sperry court did
not concern itself with the efficacy of the above division of functions, but relied
on the broader concept that a patent is a contract between the inventor and the
government33 and therefore is subject to the general rules for interpretation of
contracts- a viewpoint stressing the legal nature of the procedure involved. The
court accentuated its view by considering the documents creating the patent to
"constitute one of the most difficult legal instruments to draw with accuracy, . . . , 34
Marshall v. New Inventor's Club35 is another case emphasizing the nature of the
acts performed. There the court enjoined a corporation from rendering opinions
as to patentability, preparing patent applications and preparing amendments to
such applications on the grounds that such actions constituted the practice of law,
prohibited by law to corporations.
[Tihe rendering of an opinion as to patentability requires a knowledge
of the patent statutes and of the decisions interpreting them. A knowledge
of the decisions would be particularly essential in determining questions
concerning patentable inventions. Clearly the rendering of such opinions
constitutes the giving of legal advice.
Because of the knowledge of statutes and decisions required to prepare
applications in such a way that valuable rights would not be lost, it is
the opinion of the Court that the preparing of patent applications con-
stitutes the practice of law .... 36
With regard to the preparation of the amendments to these applications, the
court stated that even a greater knowledge of the law is required "and the reasoning
is therefore stronger that this activity, . . . constitutes the practice of law.,
3 7
Both Marshall and Sperry argue further that the procedures preliminary to
the creation of the patent right - search, application, and amendment - must
constitute the practice of law since they have far-reaching legal effects. Recognizing
the possibility of an appeal, the Sperry court explained that "if these documents
do not adequately reflect and present the applicant's right, as required by law and
the decisions of the courts, valuable legal rights, which if properly presented to
the Patent Office might be saved on review, will be lost."' 8 The court concluded:
"[a]ll that is done in the proceedings before the Patent Office must therefore
be done with the view that what is done will or may ultimately be interpreted
as to meaning and measured as to sufficiency by a court or courts.1
39
32 For interferences generally see 37 C.F.R. § 1.201-12 (1960). Section 208 uses the
phrase "attorney or agent." See also Hood and Emhardt, What the General Lawyer Should
Know About the Patent Lawyer's Specialty, 38 NEB. L.R. 576 (1959). The authors, while stat-
ing that interference proceedings are so complicated that only a lawyer should attempt to handle
them, nevertheless, point out that in the overwhelming majority of cases interferences' are settled
and do not even reach the point of filing evidence.
33 See, e.g., National Hollow Brake Beam Co. v. Interchangeable Brake Beam Co., 106 Fed.
693 (8th Cir. 1901). There the court stated:
A patent is a contract by which the government secures to the patentee the
exclusive right to vend and use his invention for a few years, in consideration
of the fact that he has perfected and described it and has granted its use to
the public forever after. The general rules for the interpretation of grants
and contracts govern its construction. Id. at 701.
34 140 So.2d at 592. (Emphasis added.)
35 117 N.E.2d 737 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. 1953).
36 Id. at 739.
37 Ibid.
38 140 So.2d at 593.
39 Ibid.
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The "legal effect" was not considered to control the question as to whether
or not the act of preparing the documents is the practice of law in Loeb. There
the court stated that "the drafting of documents, when merely incidental to the
work of a distinct occupation, is not the practice of law, although the documents
have legal consequences.1
40
This question then presents itself: Conceding that the preliminary procedures
performed by a patent agent will have legal effects, are they so inherently legal
in nature as to require that only one with legal training could handle them
adequately? Referring to government agencies generally, the attempted pre-
emption by lawyers has been challenged:
[T]hose who are fully familiar with the particular field of governmental
activity may well be more effective guides to affected private interests than
might a counsellor at law. Then when administrative matters go to hearing,
the proceedings are not inevitably of so complicated a nature as to require
representation by one learned in the law.
41
With regard to Patent Office procedure, for a patent practitioner to be fully
familiar witht his specialty he must enjoy a certain amount of technical or scientific
competence. Mr. John Dienner, former president of the American Patent Law
Association, argues that legal skill is secondary to this technical skill in patent
procedures.
Practitioners skilled in the phase of the Patent Law which has to do
with the preparation and prosecution of applications before the . .. Patent
Office... need not be members of the Bar to be of great value to inventors
who wish to secure patents. Since the patent is entirely a creature of statute,
the branch of the Law relating to the preparation and prosecution of
applications before the Patent Office is largely self-contained. * * * But it
requires, on the other hand, a knowledge of the technical aspects of in-
vention, . . . This necessitates a high degree of technical specialization.
Hence, a person educated in the particular branch of art in which his
practice . . . occurs, with fair knowledge of the statutory patent law and
familiarity with the Rules of Practice of the Patent Office is frequently of
far greater service to an industry working in that art than would be the
foremost member of the Bar. In many such situations admission to the Bar
adds very little if anything to the value of the man's services to the client in
that limited capacity.4 2
Mr. Dienner's conclusions are augmented by the Hoover Commission Report
which concluded:
The privilege of representation before Federal agencies cannot be confined
to one profession or any group within a profession. The Federal Government
cannot perform its functions efficiently without the assistance of thousands
of skilled persons serving as intermediaries. . . . Nonlawyer representatives
perform valuable services in supplementing the primary responsibility of the
Bar. * * *
Our task force considered problems of nonlawyer representation before
various agencies in special fields, such as patents and trade marks. . . . In
40 52 N.E.2d at 31. The court said further:
All these things are done in the usual course of the work of occupations
that are universally recognized as distinct from the practice of law. * * *
There are instruments that no one but a well trained lawyer should ever
undertake to draw. But there are others, common in the commercial world,
and fraught with substantial legal consequences, that lawyers seldom are
employed to draw, and that in the course of recognized occupations other
than the practice of law are often drawn by laymen for other laymen....
See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America 121 F. Supp. 792 (D.Del. 1954).
41 Gellhorn, Cincinnati Conference on Law and Lawyers In The Modern World, 15 U.
CINe. L. Rav. 196, 200-01 (1941).
42 Dienner, supra note 28 at 830. Also emphasizing this technical skill is rule 341 (c) of
the Patent Office Rules of Practice which states:
No person will be admitted .. .unless he shall . . . establish to the satisfac-
tion of the Commissioner that he is of good moral character and of good
repute and possessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications
necessary to enable him to render applicants for patents valuable service.
(Emphasis added.)
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general it found a proper place for nonlawyer representatives in certain
aspects of each of these subjects. 43
Restriction of Patent Agents: Examination
An additional argument for the proposition that nonlawyer practitioners before
the patent office are capable of performing valuable services- in the limited areas
of search, application and amendment-is the fact that one of the requirements
for admission to practice is the passing of a rigorous examination.4 4 The Patent
Office, conscious of the harm that could accrue to private interests by the inadequate
representation of rights, is the only federal administration agency that has found it
necessary to subject attorneys, as well as agents to these examinations4 5 in order to
establish their qualifications to render competent service to those who might retain
them.
Contrast this with the Sperry court's position that the public suffers, as does
the public image of the legal profession and the judicial system, when those "not
qualified" to do so are "permitted to hold themselves out as qualified to practice
law and as worthy of the trust and confidence of those who have legal problems
the solution of which require trained advice and counsel."4 6
On the contrary, the fact that patent agents are subjected to a rigid examination
in the very area in which they will specialize vitiates the court's conclusion that
these agents are unqualified. Since these agents are tested on matters of patent law
and procedure as well as on their ability to draft patent claims, the feared harm
to the public is not in fact likely to occur.
47
Restriction of Patent Agents: Ethical restraints
The Florida court further contends that a patent agent is not subject to the
safeguards which assure a true fiduciary bond in the lawyer-client relationship since
he is not governed by the same ethical restraints as are members of the legal pro-
fession. The court fears that the agent, having no restraints, will be free to act in
a manner unbecoming his profession to the detriment of clients, without danger of
any censure. The court could not reach this conclusion without a complete dis-
regard of the rules of practice of the Patent Office which provide penalties, and
ultimately discharge, from practice for "failure to conform to the standards of
ethical and professional conduct generally applicable to attorneys before the courts
of the United States."48
43 COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT,
LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE: A REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, § E, at 40 (1955).
44 Rule 341 (c) states: •
In order that the Commissioner may determine whether a person seeking
to have his name placed upon either of the registers has the qualifications
specified, satisfactory proof of good moral character and repute, and of suf-
ficient basic training in scientific and technical matters must be submitted
and an examination which is held from time to time must be taken and
passed.
45 Gellhorn, note 41 supra at 199 states that while agencies in the main sharply differentiate
between attorneys and others in a representative capacity by requiring of the latter that they
furnish somewhat special evidences of their training and skill, members of the bar are as a rule
accepted on faith. "Only the Patent Office has felt it necessary to subject attorneys to examina-
tions in order to establish their qualifications...."
46 140 So.2d at 595. The court says further:
It is the effort to reduce this loss by the members of the public that primarily
justifies the control of admissions to the practice of law, discipline of those
who are admitted, and the prohibition of the practice to those who have not
proved their qualifications and been admitted.
47 This conclusion is corroborated by the Hoover Commission Report, supra note 43, at
42. The Report states that "[i]n none of these areas was there a serious problem with respect
to nonlawyers holding themselves out as general practitioners in matters which clearly constitute
the practice of law."
,48 37 C.F.R. § 1.344 (1960).
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Professor Walter Gellhorn, of Columbia University Law School, speaking on
the subject of ethical restraints states that "[T]he profession's code of ethics... is
not so esoteric that it cannot be adapted to the conditions of administrative practice,
and there made applicable to nonlawyer as well as the legal practitioner." 49
In the case of Kingsland v. Dorsey5" the Supreme Court sustained the authority
of the Commissioner of Patents to disbar a lawyer for gross misconduct, recognizing
that practice before the Patent Office is professional in character and is subject to
such regulation. The court discussed the statute under which the Commissioner
acted as it relates to the character and conduct of persons in the field of patents
and stated that "[i]t was the Commissioner, not the courts, that Congress made
primarily responsible for protecting the public from the evil consequences that might
result if practitioners should betray their high trust."5' Significantly this case con-
cerned breaches of trust by a lawyer in the prosecution of a patent application,
a demonstration that the standards imposed by the Patent Office apply equally to
both lawyer and nonlawyer practitioners.
Thus, the advocation of a standard of ethics made applicable to nonlawyer as
well as the legal practitioner appears to have become a reality in the patent field,
thereby diminishing the validity of the Florida court's conclusion that nonlawyers
be excluded because they lack supervision comparable to the bar's supervision of
attorneys. In the patent area, an agent and attorney are governed by the same
standards of conduct - the rules of practice of the Patent Office,52 which are similar
to the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association.53
Breadth of Florida Court's Injunction:
The provisions of the injunction in Sperry which prohibit the respondent from
rendering opinions as to patentability, prohibit him from holding himself out as
qualified to prepare and prosecute patent applications and amendments thereto,
and prohibit him from actually preparing and prosecuting such applications and
amendments, are too broad. The scope of this injunction is inconsistent with the
division of function and classification of the areas of law involved in patent practice,
in which the patent agent deals with a self-contained body of statutory law and
not with the general law as it regards persons or property, and with the fact that
patent agents are subjected to examinations to determine their qualifications and
are governed by ethical restraints administered by the Commissioner.
The Florida Court relied on the case of Chicago Bar Association v. Kellogg 4
but did not limit the injunction as did the Illinois court in that case. Kellogg also
involved a nonlawyer, registered patent agent. He was enjoined from performing
a series of acts which the court held constituted the practice of law in Illinois,
such as the preparation of legal documents, the giving of legal advice, and the
participation in court proceedings within the state. However, the court recognized
the right of Kellogg to "advise and assist applicants for patents in the presentation
and prosecution of their applications before the United States Patent Office,...
49 Gellhorn, supra note 41, at 203.
50 338 U.S. 318 (1949).
51 Id. at 319-20.
52 See note 44 supra.
53 Compare Rule 345 of the Patent Office Rules of Practice which defines as unprofessional
conduct the use of advertising, circulars, letters, cards, and similar material to solicit patent
business, directly or indirectly with Canons of Professional Ethics of the A.B.A. which provides:
It is unprofessional to solicit professional employment by circulars [or] adver-
tisements. Indirect advertisements . . .such as furnishing or inspiring news-
paper comment, and all other like self-laudation, offend the traditions and
lower the tone of our profession and are reprehensible.
54 338 Ill. App. 618, 88 N.E.2d 519 (1949).
55 Comment on the Kellogg case by von Baur, Practice Before Administrative Agencies And
the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 15 FFD. B.J. 103, 109 (1955). Mr. von Baur is pointing out
that the injunction in Kellogg did not go to these preliminary actions of a patent agent. It
NOTES
Although enjoining the respondent from practicing law, the court excluded from
the scope of the injunction the preliminary actions of search, application and
amendment taken by a patent agent, evidently inferring that those procedures do
not constitute the practice of law. The court in Sperry failed to make this distinction.
By the scope of its injunction, the Florida court is claiming a certain field for
the lawyer, to the exclusion of others. Such a pre-emption is not without challenge,
even among lawyers:
[I]t would be tilting at a mill to seek to make exclu.tively ours those functions
which though properly ours are enjoyed by us as tenants in common with
others. Yet it seems that this overlapping of legitimate fields of endeavor is
often ignored. Lawyers search for protective barriers without realizing that
they may be attempting to enclose common ground.... Legal knowledge is
involved in many a business transaction. 50
Proposed Solution
A barrier against the inept and unscrupulous can be erected without the total
exclusion of nonlawyer practice before the Patent Office-the logical result of a
widespread adoption of the decision in Sperry. Such, generalized proscription of
lay representation in patent matters would not be justified in the face of evidence
such as the Hoover Report, that within this limited area nonlawyers have effectively
and honorably served their principals. In the light of this experience, "attempted
monopolization of administrative practice by the legal profession would be difficult
to defend."
57
Patent agents perform valuable and needed services in an area, limited by a
tight statutory framework, and emphasizing technical skill. These services, while
legal in effect are not shown to be so inherently legal as to constitute the practice
of law. The real problem in this area is to restrain the agent who has prosecuted
the application from assisting his client in gaining advantage from the patent by
drawing instruments of conveyance, rendering opinions on infringement, or even
threatening others with suits for infringement- work properly and exclusively
belonging to the legal profession.
The solution therefore is not. to bar all nonlawyers by such a sweeping interdict
of nonlawyer practice, but to recognize their usefulness in this limited area and
fortify the machinery defining the boundary between the two areas.
11. State Regulatory Power over Practice of Law
The greatest area of conflict between Battelle and Sperry is the contrary con-
clusions reached as to the power of a state to prevent a patent agent, licensed to
practice before the Patent Office, from performing actions which, in the court's
opinion, amount to the practice of law. Thus, the question narrows to the power
of the state courts to regulate practice of law and the extent to which that power
can be allowed to interfere with an act of Congress which places a similar power
in the Commissioner of Patents. The Supreme Court of Florida, in Sperry, stated:
was concerned instead specifically with the preparing of assignments and leases, the threatening
of suits for infringement, and for the general acts of holding himself out as an attorney. The
court stated that in the limited field defined qualified nonattorneys might represent applicants
in the presentation and prosecution of applications for patents. It made a definite distinction
between these preliminary actions, and those actions constituting the practice of law.
56 Ashley, The Unauthorized Practice Of Law, 16 A.B.A.J. 558, 559 (1930).
[Wie need a general acceptance of a new type of definition [of practice of
law]. We need a delineation of the field which is exclusively legal; a defini-
tion which excludes the activities of bankers, realtors, tax advisors, insurance
experts, accountants, investment counsel, ad infinitum. We need a definition
comprehending all matters which should be ours exclusively, yet not including
activities which are ours -competitively. More important, the public needs
such a delineation for its guidance and protection. Id. at 560.
57 Gellhorn, supra note 41, at 208.
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While we agree that each ... of those federal agencies which are authorized
by Congress to do so may determine who shall be permitted to practice
before them, we do not agree that such authority in any way gives those
bodies the authority also to determine that those licensed by it have the
right to practice law, in the particular field involved, within the borders
of this state.
5 8
Contrast with this the Battelle court's determination:
[W]e conclude that control of practice before the U. S. Patent Office is a
superior right vested exclusively by the United States Constitution and by
act of Congress in the Commissioner of Patents, subject to appeal to the
federal courts, and the state courts, by virtue of article VI, of the United
States Constitution, are bound thereby and precluded from interfering.50
As a general proposition it can be stated that a state acting under its police
power has the right to define the practice of law and to determine who is qualified
to practice within its borders. 60 In the Kellogg case, the Illinois court stated:
The police power and the procedure [under Illinois law] .. . covering the
enrollment and disbarment of lawyers and the punishment of unauthorized
practitioners subject to its jurisdiction is a matter reserved for determination
by the Judicial Department of the state of Illinois.61
And, the court adds, Congress never intended the patent laws to displace the police
power of the States.
The court in Richmond Ass'n of Credit Men v. Bar Ass'n 62 came to a similar
conclusion, emphasizing the inherent power of courts, apart from statute, to inquire
into the conduct of any person to determine whether he is usurping the function
of an officer of the court and illegally engaging in the practice of law, "and to put
an end to such unauthorized practice where found to exist."63 The West Virginia
court found that, with regard to regulation of the practice of law, "courts act
judicially in the exercise of an inherent power, and not in a mere administrative
or ministerial capacity,... 16 And, according to a Nebraska court, the practice of
law is so intimately connected with the exercise of judicial power "that the right
to define and regulate its practice naturally and logically belongs to the judicial
department of our state government."
65
Thus, it is evident that this inherent power is exercised as a dominant and
exclusive power by the courts. Some will even hold any legislation concerning the
practice of law to be invalid unless it is "in aid of the judiciary. 66 Furthermore,
the West Virginia court, relying on the separation of powers clause in the state
constitution, specifically rejected the defendant's contention that the judiciary did
not have an exclusive power to define the practice of law: "[Tihe judicial depart-
ment ... has the inherent power to define, supervise, regulate and control practice
of law and . . . the legislature cannot restrict or impair this power of the courts or
permit or authorize laymen to engage in the practice of law."1
67
58 140 So.2d at 594.
59 No. 6704, C.A. Ohio, Feb. 13, 1962 at 11.
60 See, e.g., Bradwell v. the State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 131 (1872).
61 Chicago Bar Association v. Kellogg, supra note 54 at 523.
62 167 Va. 327, 189 S.E. 153 (1937).
63 Id. at 157.
64 West Virginia State Bar v. Earley, 144 W.V.504, 109 S.E.2d 420, 436. (1959).
65 In re Integration of Nebraska State Bar Ass'n, 133 Neb. 283, 275 N.W. 265 (1937).
66 See, e.g., Application of Sedille, 66 N.M. 267, 347 P.2d 162 (1959). For a definition of
this phrase see Bennett, Non-Lawyers and the Practice of Law Before State and Federal Agen-
cies, 46 A.B.A.J. 705, 706 (1960). Professor Bennett states:
The majority of courts have taken the position that a legislature may enact
reasonable provisions relating to admission to the Bar and regulation of
illegal practice. However, this is usually done on the theory that at most
this is a concurrent exercise, valid under the police power only so long as it
does not involve interference with or frustration of the courts in the perform-
ance of their duties; or, such statutes are permitted on the rationale that they
implement the exclusive prerogative of the court.
67 144 W.V. 504, 109 S.E.2d at 436.
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Scope of inherent judicial power
It is important then to delineate the scope of this inherent judicial power,
broadly announced as giving the judiciary the final say in all matters relating to
the practice of law. The doctrine has been widely reiterated that members of the
bar are officers of the court and amenable to it as their superior. Being such, the
court has an immediate interest in the character of the bar for its own sake. 8
Since the usefulness of courts depends to a large extent on the maintaining of the
dignity which should attach to them, this power extends to the regulation of the
practice of law insofar as it has a bearing on the dignity of the court.
6 9
Advocates of a limited judicial dominance argue that the power of the court
to uphold its own dignity is the basis of the power to regulate admissions to and
discipline members of the bar, and that courts may properly consider their power
dominant only when their primary concern is the protection of the dignity of the
judicial process. "[I]t is not however, a proper basis for the regulation of all activities
which the courts choose to label the 'practice of law.' ,,7 0 Proponents of this view attack
those cases in which the courts consider primarily the protection of the public
rather than the dignity of the judicial process in determining what activity is the
practice of law.
[I]n asserting their duty to protect the public from lay practice before ad-
ministrative agencies, the courts should recognize that they are acting in an
area in which the legislative policy determination should be dominant.
71
Thus, according to this view of the current legislative-judicial balance in the area
of practice of law, the judicial dominance announced in Earley and in Sperry would
be too broad.
For decades, if not for centuries, control over practice and procedure
has been the subject of a concurrent jurisdiction. There were the courts
with an alleged inherent power to engage in rule-making, and there were
the legislatures which in fact exercised and were, with but rare dissent,
conceded ultimate authority over virtually the entire procedural area.
7 2
The limited view then, stands for the proposition that if the test for dominant
judicial power is the relation of the area regulated to the judicial process, the
assertion of a dominant judicial power over all practice of law would be incon-
sistent with the recognition of a dominant legislative power over rule making.
73
On the other hand, the argument is expressed that the scope of the inherent
judicial power over practice of law should not be limited to merely protecting the
dignity of the judiciary, but should extend to encompass .the entire area of practice
of law. Whether the judicial power over the practice of law be characterized as
exclusive, allowing only for legislation in aid of the courts, or as concurrent providing
the legislative action is not inimical to the functioning of the courts, or even if the
power .is deemed to- be legislative subject to a test of reasonableness "which takes
account of effects on the general administration of justice and due process, the
judiciary is asserting final authority.17 4 Advocates of this view stress that given
68 In re Integration of Nebraska State Bar Ass'n, 133 Neb. 283, 275 N.W. at 267 (1937).
69 Id. at 268. The court states:
[A]side from the mere intellectual aid to be rendered the court by a com-
petent bar, there is the inherent right of the court to surround itself with
honest assistants who are sympathetic and will unite with it in the proper
administration of justice and in maintaining that administration on a high
plane. That is the main business of the court; and whatever obstructs or
embarrasses its chief function, must be under its control; it cannot practically
reside anywhere else.
70 Note, 28 U.Cru. L.R. 162, 165 (1960).
71 Id. at 166.
72 Levin and Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem in
Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 3 (1958).
73 Supra note 70, at 167.
74 Bennett, supra note 66, at 707.
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the present framework of divided subject matter jurisdiction between courts and
agencies, "the preservation of an effective system would seem to require over-all
judicial responsibility.. .. ,,75
This argument for a broad judicial power over practice of law is summed up
in the Rhode Island case of Creditors Service Corporation v. Cummings:6
Although the Legislature may not subvert the power of the judiciary,
yet it may, in the exercise of the police power, pass laws which are in aid
of the judicial power that it deems necessary or expedient. In the exercise
of this power, the Legislature may properly enact a statute designed to
protect the public, but it has no power to pass a law granting the right
to anyone to practice law. The former type of enactment tends to strengthen
the judicial authority to regulate the practice of law and so assists the court
in protecting the public . . . , while the latter is an encroachment upon the
judicial power and invalid because it is in derogation of the inherent and
exclusive prerogative of the court.
77
The Supreme Court has never expressed the view, held by some state courts,
that prescribing qualifications for administrative practice is an inherent judicial
power,"8 but on the contrary, has held that an administrative tribunal, even in the
absence of explicit statutory authority to do so, may properly establish standards
of admission to practice before it.79
The judicial attitude engendered by the assumption of a dominant judicial
power illustrates a lack of appreciation by the courts of the importance of non-
legal skills. A legislature freed from these restrictions might be better able to
establish and define more clearly the requirements for particular areas of practice
by making more realistic and helpful distinctions than that between attorneys and
nonattorneys8 0 Just as a court has the inherent power to determine who should
be licensed to appear in court in a representative capacity, an agency should have
the final power to determine what qualifications are suitable for its own "bar.
' 8t
It may be that only particular limited legal skills are necessary, and where such
is the case, the commission or agency itself would seem to be best able to ascertain
the necessary qualifications.
State Judicial Power v. Federal Legislative Power
Whether or not the scope of the inherent supremacy of the judiciary with
regard to a state legislative enactment in the area of practice of law is broad or
limited, the- crucial question to be considered with respect to patent agents is
whether this state power extends to a federal legislative enactment allowing non-
lawyers to practice before the Patent Office.
The court in Battelle dismisses the contention that such regulatory power
extends to a federal enactment. The court bases its argument primarily on Article
VI of the United States Constitution which states that laws of the United States
made in pursuance to the constitution "shall be the supreme Law of the land;
and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution
or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." By the power specifically
75 Ibid.
76 57 R.I. 122, 190 A.2 (1937).
77 Id. at 8. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bar v. Earley, 109 S.E.2d at 439. The court
states that the rule empowering the State Compensation Commissioner to make rules does not
authorize him to promulgate a rule authorizing a layman to practice law before the Commission.
"But even if the statute authorized the commissioner to promulgate a rule of that character such
provision of the statute would be void as a legislative encroachment upon the inherent power
of the judicial power of the government."
78 Gellhor, supra note 41, at 197.
79 Goldsmith v. United States B.T.A., 270 U.S. 117 (1926).
80 See Ashley, supra note 56.
81 Gellhorn, supra note 41, at 207.
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delegated in the Constitution,8 2 Congress enacted the patent act,83 under which
the Commissioner of Patents is given authority to make regulations concerning
admission of agents and attorneys.84 The Commissioner has exercised this statutory.
power, enacting the rule that "applicants may be represented by an attorney or
agent."8  Although Battelle found that the judiciary has exclusive control over the
practice of law it recognized an exception with regard to patent agents.
[Pjersons admitted to the practice of law by Ohio courts are not thereby
qualified to practice in patent matters before the U. S. Patent Office. This
power has been reserved by the United States Constitution to Congress, and
in turn by Congress it has been granted only to the 'Commissioner of Patents.
This leaves the Ohio Courts in the position of being unable to exercise con-
trol over that which they do not have the power to authorize in the first
instance.8 6
In accord with the decision in Battelle is the case of De Pass v. B. Harris Wool
Co. 87 where the court had to reconcile a Missouri statute outlawing practice before
administrative boards by laymen and the rules of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission which allow persons other than attorneys to be admitted to practice before
it. The court concluded that the ICC rule took precedence over both the state
statute and state policy and said:
Defendant seems to argue that the right to define the practice of law
and to regulate persons engaging in such practice falls within the police
power of the state. So it does, except in so far as that. right does not run
contra to an Act "made in pursuance" to the Federal constitution.88
The reasoning in Battelle is further substantiated by In re Lyon, 9 a proceeding
to restrain unauthorized persons from practicing law in the area of representing
creditors in bankruptcy proceedings. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts implied
that regulation of professions, such as law, is primarily a matter of state concern
and that the police power does not end merely because such matters may become
in some way federal in nature. The court stated however that "our policy and our
statute must yield to any valid rule, order, or established practice of the Federal
courts controlling the practice of law in respect to matters within their jurisdic-
tion."8 10 Since federal law permitted a layman to make a business of representing
creditors to some extent in bankruptcy, the court had no power to interfere with
the exercise of that privilege.
Conclusion
Since Congress has expressly given the Patent Office the power to enact rules
for its conduct, and since any rules so enacted, if within the powers of the office
82 U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8:
The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
83 66 Stat. 792 (1952), 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293.
84 Id. at § 31 provides:
The Commissioner . . .may prescribe regulations governing the recognition
and conduct of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing applicants or
other parties before the Patent Office....
85 37 C.F.R. § 1.341 (b) (1960).
86 Supra note 59, at 10. The court says further:
Were the courts of each state to control practice before the United States
Patent Office, thus usurping a right to control that which they cannot au-
thorize in the first instance, by considering it to constitute the practice of
law within their state; then the. courts of the 50 states, by ignoring the provi-
sions of Article VI of the United States Constitution, could render the pro-
visions of Congress in regard to practice before the Patent Office . . . a
nullity.
87 346 Mo. 1029, 144 S.W.2d 146 (1940).
88 Id. at 148.
89 301 Mass. 30, 16 N.E.2d 74 (1938").
90 Id. at 77.
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and reasonable, are just as authoritative as the laws of Congress itself,91 the state
is powerless to interfere.
The fact that this conclusion has been reached in cases where the authorized
actions more closely approximate the practice of law tends to substantiate the
Battelle decision. In De Pass, for example, the plaintiff was employed to represent
persons in rate reduction cases before the Interstate Commerce Commission-
adversary proceedings clearly more of the nature of practice of law than those
actions performed by a patent agent. Nevertheless, the court allowed the ad-
ministrative regulation authorizing lay admission to practice to override state statutes
and policies. In the Lyon case, members of a collection agency advised others as
to whether a lawsuit should be commenced. The court held that such actions
require special knowledge of the legal elements constituting a cause of action, and
while it restrained some of the activities it nevertheless bowed*to federal supremacy
by stating that its order "shall not affect the exercise by the respondents of any
privilege which they now possess or may acquire under any statute, rule, order or
established practice of the Tederal government . . . controlling methods of prac-
tice .... "92
However, the dividing line for determining whether state courts can regulate
practice authorized by a federal statute is generally agreed to be when that practice
clearly constitutes the practice of law. 93 While Battelle, carried to its logical con-
clusion would hold that even if a patent agent's actions clearly constituted the
practice of law the supremacy clause of the Constitution would preclude a state
court from interfering, the more reasonable rule appears to be that if the actions
are clearly the practice of law, the state can exercise its power. Agran v. Shapiro
94
stands for the proposition that the state power might well be dominant in this area,
even where the agency explicitly intended to authorize nonlawyers to engage in the
practice of law.
As was pointed out, the actions performed by patent agents in their limited
area are not clearly the practice of law. In fact, the evidence of the division in the
Patent Office and the recognition of the technical competence required for such
practice requires the conclusion that such actions are clearly not the practice of
law. Thus, the decision in Petition of Kearney95 which states that "those who hold
themselves out to practice in any field or phase of law must be members of the
Florida Bar, amenable to the rules and regulations of Florida Courts," cannot be
treated as dispositive of the Sperry case.
Even in a jurisdiction which reserves some power to regulate practice of law
before federal administrative agencies, the exercise of this power should be based
only on a clear demonstration that what is being regulated is "the practice of law."
The injunction in Sperry is too broad because the court attempts to remove
from the patent agent any right to act before the Patent Office even in a limited
capacity, without a clear showing that these actions constitute the practice of law.
Without such a showing, the power they attempted to exercise vis--a-vis this federal
regulation must fail.96
Hurley D. Smith
91 Koechlin v. Marble, 2 Mackey 12, 13 D.C. 12 (1883).
92 301 Mass. 60, 16 N.E.2d at 77.
93 von Baur, supra note 55 at 122.
94 127 Cal. App. 2d 807, 273 P.2d 619 (1954).
95 63 So. 2d 630, 631 (Fla. 1953).
96 The Supreme Court overruled the decision of the Supreme Court of Florida in the Sperry
case relying on the Supremacy Clause. Sperry v. Florida Bar, 31 LAW W. 4531 (1963).
